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The Tax Reform Act of 1986: Simplification and the
Future Viability of Accrual Taxation
The distinction between capital gain and ordinary income has long
been perceived as unduly complicating.1 Because of the distinction, the
Internal Revenue Code has had to include numerous provisions defining
capital assets and guarding against attempts to shift income and losses
between capital and ordinary.2 A common view among tax scholars is
that eliminating the capital gain structure would substantially reduce the
size and complexity of the Code.3 As a result, it was not surprising that
Congress repealed the popular long-term capital gain exclusion in the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (1986 Act).
4
While simplification, of course, was an avowed purpose of the 1986
Act,5 the Act did nothing more than abolish the preferential rate for
long-term gains. To truly simplify the Code, Congress must confront the
need to control the taxpayer's power to recognize capital losses at will,
while at the same time postponing recognition of capital gain. One
method commonly proposed to alleviate this problem is the periodic ac-
counting of accrued capital gains and accrued capital losses.6 Unfortu-
nately, tax commentators have routinely condemned this type of system
as administratively infeasible.7 Recently, however, Professor David
1 See, e.g., Bittker, Tax Reform and Tax Simplfication, 29 U. MIaMI L. REV. 1, 4 (1974) ("The fact
that long-term capital gains are subject to a lower tax rate than other types of income is perhaps the
single most complicating aspect of existing law."); Hickman, Capital Gains and Simplification, in FED-
ERAL INCOME TAX SIMPLIFICATION 223 (C. Gustafson ed. 1979) ("Capital gains is often cited as one of
the greatest complicating features of the federal income tax system."); Kornhauser, The Origins of
Capital GainsTaxation: What's Law Got To Do With It?, 39 Sw. L.J. 869, 870 (1985) ("[Capital gains
taxation] is the source of much of the complexity of the Code .... ); Mayhall, Capital Gains Taxa-
tion-The First One Hundred Years, 41 LA. L. REv. 81 (1980) ("Indeed, the presence of... [preferential
treatment of capital transactions] in the income tax laws of the United States is largely responsible
for the complexity of those laws.").
2 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1221, 1239, 1245, 1250, 1252, 1255 (1982 and Supp. III 1985).
3 See supra note 1.
4 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 301(a) (Oct. 22, 1986).
5 See SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3-4 (1986). In fact, both the major tax reform proposals made by the Treasury Department in
November 1984 (TREASURY I, see infra note 26) and the President's response (see infra note 26) used
the term in their title.
6 See, e.g., R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 231 (2d ed.
1976); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., FACING THE TAX PROBLEM 476-84 (1937); Blum, A Handy
Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAXES 247, 254 (1957); Shoup, The White Paper: Accrual
Accounting for Capital Gains and Losses, 18 CAN. TAXJ. 96 (1970).
7 See, e.g., General Tax Reform: Panel Discussions Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 285 (1973) (testimony of Professor Richard Musgrave) ("Obviously .... taxation of
all current but unrealized gains on an annual accrual basis would be unmanageable."); U.S. DEPT. OF
THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 5 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter BLUEPRINTS] ("The
proposal does not recommend taxation of gains as accrued (that is prior to realization) because the
administrative cost of annual asset valuations is prohibitive and because otherwise taxpayers might
face problems in making cash tax payments when no cash had been realized."); Bradford, The Casefor
a Personal Consumption Tax, in WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDrIURE? 83 (J. Pechman ed.
1980) ("The difficulty of obtaining annual valuations and the potential cash flow problems for tax-
payers with large accrued income but no cash income have generally led to the acceptance.., of a
realization basis for capital gains accounting."); Lowndes, Current Conceptions of Taxable Income, 25
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Shakow has offered a proposal which attempts to make accrual taxation a
true alternative for tax reform.8
This note examines Professor Shakow's claim that a tax system based
on taxation of capital gains can actually be simpler than a system which
defers taxation of capital gain. Part I outlines the reasons why only the
preferential rate on capital gains was repealed, and why the capital gain-
ordinary income distinction was retained. Part II discusses the compet-
ing models of accrual and consumption taxation, and locates the current
system on the tax spectrum. Part III summarizes the Shakow model of
accrual taxation. Part IV analyzes the recent tax reform's effect on the
Code's complexity and the additional simplification that might be
achieved by a further move toward an accrual tax system. Finally, Part V
questions whether accrual taxation is a pragmatic alternative following
the recent tax reform.
I. Tax Reform Act of 1986: Repealing the Preferential Rate
The 1986 Act eliminates the previous highly progressive rate sched-
ule with rates ranging to fifty percent, and establishes two tax brackets
with rates of fifteen percent and twenty-eight percent.9 Because of this
overall rate reduction, Congress concluded that the need to provide a
reduced rate for net capital gain was eliminated.' 0 Congress justified this
elimination not only by lower individual rates, but also by the resulting
"tremendous amount of simplification for many taxpayers since their tax
will no longer depend upon the characterization of income as ordinary or
capital gain." 11 Furthermore, Congress perceived that this action would
result in a greater willingness to invest in freely traded assets, because
Congress also eliminated the requirement that taxpayers hold capital as-
sets for an extended period of time in order to receive favorable
treatment. 12
The 1986 Act also eliminates the distinction between long-term and
short-term losses for purposes of offsetting ordinary income.' 3 As a re-
sult, it no longer takes two dollars of long-term capital losses to offset
one dollar of ordinary income. Instead, taxpayers can offset any capital
losses, dollar-for-dollar, against up to three thousand dollars of ordinary
income.
OHIO ST. LJ. 151, 181 (1964) ("The administrative difficulties in connection with such a plan are so
great that it is unlikely that Congress will ever adopt it."); Wetzler, Capital Gains and Losses, in COM-
PREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 115, 120 (J. Pechman ed. 1977) ("Completely eliminating deferral
means taxing on accrual, which must be ruled out because it would be extraordinarily difficult to
value nonmarketable assets every year in order to measure the accrued gain or loss.").
8 Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1111
(1986).
9 Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 101(a).
10 S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 169 (1986).
I1 Id.
12 Id.
13 Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 301(b)(10). See also Gardner and Stewart, Capital Gains and Losses After
The Tax Reform Act of 1986, 65 TAXES 125 (1987). Elimination of the preferential treatment of long-
term capital gain required changes to other provisions of the Code making reference to the prefer-
ential treatment. See Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 301(a) (providing conforming amendments to §§ 62(a),
172(d), 129(0, 223, 642(c), 643(a), 691(c), 871(a), 1211(b), 1212(b), and 1402(i)).
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These changes raise three questions. First, does the elimination of
the preferential rate address the problems peculiar to capital gains that
may have originally justified their favorable treatment? Second, is the
preferential rate elimination stable? Third, could Congress have simpli-
fied the Code further by eliminating the distinction between ordinary in-
come and capital gain entirely?
A. Rationale for Favorable Treatment
The preferential rate for capital gains mitigated three major inequi-
ties in the federal income tax system: Bunching, lock-in, and illusory
gains due to inflation. 14 Gains are normally accrued in increments over
several years. In certain situations, however, these increments may be
taxed in a single year at progressive rates. This could propel a large part
of the gain into unduly high tax brackets.' 5 The preferential rate on cap-
ital gains had alleviated the bunching problem because it excluded a sub-
stantial portion of the gain from tax. Similarly, the substantial flattening
of the tax structure under the 1986 Act reduces the bunching problem,
because no part of the gain can be propelled into a higher than twenty-
eight percent tax bracket.
The lock-in effect is a consequence of the realization requirement.'
6
Because capital gains are not taxed until realized, investors are discour-
aged from selling appreciated assets. 17 This disincentive to sell impedes
the free flow of investment capital, resulting in a misallocation of re-
sources and a reduction in market efficiency.' 8 The capital gains exclu-
sion had reduced this effect because it reduced the tax on property sold
by only taxing forty percent of the gain.' 9 With the 1986 Act's repeal of
the exclusion, the tax rate on realized gains increases from a maximum of
twenty percent to a maximum of twenty-eight percent.20 This increase in
14 Congress provided the first form of preferential treatment for capital gains in the Revenue Act
of 1921 in an attempt to mitigate the bunching and lock-in problems. The Act segregated the excess
of capital gains over capital losses, i.e., net capital gain, from other income and taxed the amount at a
flat 12.5%. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 206(b), 42 Stat. 227, 233. See generally STAFF OFJoINT
ComMrrrEE ON TAxATION, 98TH CONG., 1sT SEss., TAXATION OF CAPITAL GMANS AND LOSSES 5-6
(Comm. Print 1983) (discussing the various arguments for preferential treatment of capital gains);
Waggoner, Eliminating the Capital Gains Preference. Part I The Problems of Inflation, Bunching and Lock-In,
48 U. COLO. L. REv. 313 (1977).
15 See Hickman, supra note 1, at 230; Wetzler, supra note 7, at 130. See generally J. PECHMAN,
FEDERAL TAX Poucy (3d ed. 1977).
16 Waggoner, supra note 14, at 366.
17 Hickman, supra note 1, at 231; Wetzler, supra note 7, at 135.
18 Wetzler, supra note 7, at 138 (stating that lock-in, by inhibiting transfers of assets, reduces the
productivity of the capital stock, interferes with the efficient allocation of new investments across
firms and industries, and induces rearrangement of asset portfolios). See also Conda, Next Year's Tax
Bilk Fix Capital Gains, 33 TAx NOTES 409, 411 (1986).
19 Use of the capital gains preference to reduce lock-in, however, gave that taxpayer an addi-
tional tax benefit; namely, the addition of the lower tax rate applied to the ultimate gain on the sale
plus the tax benefit of deferral. Waggoner, supra note 14, at 367.
20 Capital gains tax rates in lower brackets will increase even more. For example, in the 1986
marginal tax bracket of 42%, capital gains were taxed at 16.8%, while the rate in 1987 increases to
28% and after 1987 to as high as 33%. Thus, individuals in the highest tax brackets will experience a
40% increase in federal capital gains taxes. Conda, supra note 18, at 411.
1987] NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
the effective rate of taxation will correspondingly increase the incentive
to avoid realization, and thus aggravates the problem of lock-in.21
Perhaps most importantly, the preferential rate on capital gains com-
pensated, albeit crudely, 22 for the overstatement of capital gain that oc-
curs in inflationary periods. 23 In these periods, part or all of a capital
gain may reflect inflation and therefore is not real income.24 The result
is an increase in the effective rate of taxation.2 5 Although previous tax
reform proposals to abolish the preferential rate suggested indexing
gains to the inflation rate,26 the 1986 Act has no such provision.
B. Stability of the Repeal
Because the 1986 Act does not address the problem of lock-in and
the tendency of inflation to overstate income from capital gain, the stabil-
ity of the repeal is open to question. Congress openly admitted that it
retained the current statutory structure for capital gains in order to "fa-
cilitate reinstatement of a capital gains rate differential if there is a future
tax rate increase." 27 Thus, if Congress increases rates above the twenty-
eight percent ceiling now scheduled for post-1987 tax years, "the distinc-
tion between ordinary income and capital gain will resume its former im-
21 The lock-in problem may be magnified because the repeal of the long-term capital gain pref-
erence at the federal level will probably be adopted at the state level as well. Since most states
conform their tax structures to the federal tax base, eliminating the capital gains preference will
automatically require that most states do likewise. Consequently, if states do not lower income tax
rates, capital gains will be exposed to the maximum tax brackets. For most states, the effective tax
rates on individual capital gains will rise from 20-22% to 36-37%o. Id.
22 The long-term capital gains exclusion was not only crude, but also inequitable for those tax-
payers with other types of investment income and income as compensation for services. See Blum,
Taxation of Capital Gains in the Light of Recent Economic Developments-Some Observations, 18 NAT'L TAxJ.
430, 433 (1965). See also Waggoner, supra note 14, at 318-19.
23 J. PECHMAN, supra note 15, at 111-12; Blum, supra note 6, at 255; Hickman, supra note 1, at
232; Wetzler, supra note 7, at 128.
24 For other discussions on the inflation problem, see McDonald, Inflation: Concepts of Income, Tax
Reform, 28 TAx LAW. 533 (1975); Note, Inflation and the Federal Income Tax, 82 YALE LJ. 716 (1973);
Comment, The Feasibility of Adjusting for Inflation in Computing Taxable Income, 49 WASH. L. REV. 873
(1974).
25 See Brinner & Munnell, Taxation of Capital Gains: Inflation and Other Problems, NEw ENG. ECON.
REV., Sept.-Oct. 1974, at 7, reprinted in M. McINTYRE, F. SANDER & D. WESTFALL, READINGS IN FED-
ERAL TAXATION 406 (2d ed. 1983).
26 See, e.g., Capital Gains Tax Bills: Hearings on S. 2428, S. 2608, and S. 3065 Before the Subcomm. on
Taxation and Debt Management Generally of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 151 (1978)
(statement of William Penick) (advocating the indexation of capital asset basis to inflation in order to
include only real economic gains in income); BLUEPRINTS, supra note 7, at 5 (proposing full taxation
of capital gains realized upon sale or exchange after allowing a step-up in basis for inflation); U.S.
DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICrrY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 101 (1984)
[hereinafter TREASURY I] (proposing indexation of the basis of capital assets for the inflation which
has occurred since purchase of the asset or January 1, 1965, whichever is later); PRESIDENT'S TAX
PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICrrY (1985).
27 H. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-107 (1986). Not only is the current statutory struc-
ture retained, but the tax rate on long-term capital gains is automatically limited to 33%, even if the




portance and complexity."' 28 Most commentators predict that the repeal
will not be stable.29
C. Eliminating the Distinction
In the event that the commentators' predictions are erroneous, how-
ever, and the preferential rate is not reinstated, must the Code retain the
structural complexity caused by the distinction between capital gain and
ordinary income or could Congress have simplified the Code further by
eliminating the distinction entirely? Clearly, Congress could not elimi-
nate the distinction entirely. Congress' stated reason for retaining the
capital gain structure-facilitation of reinstatement-was only a partial
reason why Congress left the current statutory structure intact. The full
reason why Congress did not go further lies in the realization require-
ment as manifested in the capital loss provisions.
The preferential tax treatment of capital gain has always been ac-
companied by a roughly corresponding limitation on the allowance for
capital losses, because the recognition event that triggers a tax liability or
deduction is the realization of an asset's value through sale. 30 Any ac-
crued appreciation or depreciation is not taxable until that time. Accord-
ingly, a taxpayer can minimize his taxes by carefully scheduling the
realization of his gains and losses. The taxpayer will realize gains in
years when his marginal tax rate is low, and realize losses when his mar-
ginal tax rate is high. This manipulation results in the mismeasurement
of accrual income.3
5
Moreover, even if the marginal tax rate does not change, which cur-
rently is a more probable scenario given the flatter rate structure intro-
duced by the 1986 Act, the taxpayer still benefits from deferral. The
deferral provides the taxpayer holding accrued but unrealized gains, in
essence, an interest-free loan from the government for the amount of tax
deferred.3 2 Conversely, deferral decreases the tax saving value of capital
losses.33 As a result, taxpayers are motivated to time their sales so as to
28 Tax Reform 1986: Capital Gains Lose Special Status, 73 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 1 (1986).
29 See, e.g., Barker, Fixing Capital Gains, 32 TAx NoTEs 143 (1986) ("[A]s the top marginal rates
creep up the economics of the tax shelter industry ... start to make sense again, and pressure for a
special low rate of tax on capital gains becomes almost irresistible.").
30 This has not always been true. The Revenue Act of 1913 permitted the deduction of losses
incurred only on the sale of trade or business assets. 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 2135 (1915). These
deductions were then limited by The Revenue Act of 1916 to the extent of profits earned on all trade
or business investments. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 5(a)(5th), 39 Stat. 756, 759. The Revenue
Act of 1918, however, eliminated the loss deduction limitation and as a result, losses incurred in any
transaction entered into for profit were fully deductible even if they exceeded that year's total invest-
ment profits. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 214(a)(5), 40 Stat. 1057, 1067. Losses remained fully
deductible until the Revenue Act of 1924. This Act allowed only 12.5% of capital losses to offset tax
liability and abolished the carry forward of net capital losses because capital gains under the 1921
Act were taxed at a maximum rate of 12.5%. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 208(c), 43 Stat. 253,
263 (repealed); see supra note 14. From 1924 to the present, Congress has made numerous statutory
changes in the capital loss provisions, but they never reverted to the full deductibility that was pres-
ent in the 1921-24 period. See generally Mayhall, Capital Gains Taxation-The First One Hundred Years, 41
LA. L. REV. 81 (1980).
31 R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INcOME Tx 188 (1976).
32 D. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME Tx 47-48 (1986).
33 Id.
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realize their losses as they accrue, and to postpone realizing their gains
for as long as possible.3 4 By realizing his losses immediately and holding
gains until death, a taxpayer could eliminate virtually all tax liability.
35
Consequently, restrictive rules on the deductibility of capital losses are
necessary. 3
6
This need for capital loss restrictions precludes the complete elimi-
nation of the distinction between ordinary income and capital gain. If
the entire distinction were eliminated, logic would require that capital
losses be fully deductible.3 7 Full deductibility, however, would undoubt-
edly result in taxpayers realizing their losses, but declining to realize
their accrued gains.38 This tax minimizing behavior could have detri-
mental effects on revenues.3 9 The loss of revenue resulting from loss
deductions could well exceed the revenues from gains realized during
the same period.40 Taxpayers with unsuccessful investments would real-
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 This argument has prevailed in Congress since 1924, when capital losses were first made
partially deductible. An alternative argument can be made, however, for full deductibility under two
theories: Net income and economic incentive for risk taking. See Warren, The Deductibility by Individu-
als of Capital Losses under the Federal Income Tax, 40 U. Cm. L. REV. 291 (1973).
First, a capital loss is indistinguishable from any other loss such as business losses incurred in a
transaction. A taxpayer's ability to command goods and services is dependent on his net income. If
the taxpayer incurs a loss, he has less ability to buy goods and services than a second taxpayer with
equal ordinary income. This result should be reflected in the first taxpayer's tax liability by permit-
ting a deduction. If that loss is not deductible because it is a capital loss, then part of the tax effec-
tively falls on a portion of the taxpayer's capital.
Second, full deductibility is beneficial because it creates an incentive for risk taking. This incen-
tive makes new capital ventures more attractive. (In fact, the 1986 Act has made such ventures even
more unattractive because 100% of capital gains are now taxed while capital loss deductions are lim-
ited.) The relationship between full offsets and risk taking has empirical support. Domar & Mus-
grave, Proportional Income Taxation and Risk Taking, 58 QJ. ECON. 388 (1944). This theoretical model
has subsequently been modified and criticized. See, e.g., C. HALL, FISCAL POLICY FOR STABLE GROWTH
164-73 (1960); R. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 312-25 (1959); E. ROLPH, THE THE-
ORY OF FISCAL ECONOMICS 285-302 (1954); Feldstein, The Effects of Taxation on Risktaking, 77 J. POL.
ECON. 755 (1969); Litner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios
and Capital Budgets, 47 REv. ECON. & STATISTICS 13 (1965).
The basic conclusion that proportional taxation with loss offsets encourages risk-taking is now
widely accepted by economists. See, e.g., Feldstein, supra; Helliwell, The Taxation of Capital Gains, 2
CAN.J. ECON. 314 (1969); Russel & Smith, Taxation, Risk-Taking and Stochastic Dominance, 36 So. ECoN.
J. 425 (1970).
37 Hickman, supra note 1, at 237.
38 This assumes, of course, that all dispositions are tax motivated. In fact, many probably are
not. Investors often make decisions regarding when to sell based on the economic risk potential of
their investments without regard to tax consequences.
39 Commentators disagree on the tax rate's influence on investor selling. Compare STAFF OF
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., TAXATION OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES 5
(Comm. Print 1983) ("[D]ata on tax returns for the years 1979 through 1981 show a significant
increase in realization of capital gains, enough to be consistent with the proposition that the 1978
capital gains tax cuts did not lose revenue for those years.") with H. AARON & J. PECHMAN, How
TAXES AFFECT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 279 (1981) ("[A] simple comparison of changes in tax rates and
changes in aggregate realizations of gains gives little support to those who believe that tax rates
strongly influence realizations.").
40 Hickman, supra note 1, at 237. See also Blum, supra note 6, at 253. In fact, the 1930s loss
limitations were originally intended to protect federal revenues. See H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong.,
Ist Sess. 12-13 (1932), 1939-1 C. B. (Part 2) 465; H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1934),
1939-1 C. B. (Part 2) 562; PRELIMINARY REPORT OF A SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 73D CONG., 2D SEss., PREVENTION OF TAX AVOIDANCE 6, 32-37 App. exhibit C (Comm. Print
1933); SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 75TH CONG., 3D SESS., PROPOSED REVI-
[Vol. 62:779
ize sufficient capital losses to offset their taxable income, and thus could
defer payment of all their taxes. 41 In short, the distinction between capi-
tal gain and ordinary income, with all its complexity, must be retained
unless an alternative tax system can eliminate the need for the realization
requirement.
II. The Tax Spectrum
Recent tax scholarship has focused on two competing models of an
ideal tax base-the "consumption" model and the "accrual" model. In
many respects, these models represent two ends of a spectrum. Since the
inception of the income tax, tax policy has been driven between these
two ideals in the search for a simpler, fairer, and more efficient tax sys-
tem. As a result of this vacillation between accrual and consumption, tax
policy has been plagued by instability.
The Haig-Simons definition of income as the sum of consumption
plus accumulation is the intellectual basis for accrual taxation. 42 In mon-
etary terms, consumption and accumulation are represented by spending
and saving.43 If economic activity were wholly reflected by monetary
transactions, then computation of income could be accomplished easily
by reference to the source of income without regard to its uses.44 Realis-
tically, however, economic activity is only partly reflected in monetary
transactions.4 5 Money income, when bifurcated into consumption and
accumulation, reflects only purchased consumption and accumulation in
the form of money savings.46 Total income includes unpurchased con-
sumption and accumulation as well.
Thus, in order for the accumulation component to be accurately
taxed, it must reflect unrealized capital appreciation. The present system
falls short of this requirement because appreciation is not recognized as a
taxable event until it is realized-when the taxpayer disposes of the asset.
This failure to tax unrealized appreciation is the main difference between
the current system and the accrual system. Under a pure accrual system,
SION OF THE REVENUE LAWs 32 (1938); H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 7-9, 33-42 (1938),
1939-1 C. B. (Part 2) 732-33, 751-58.
41 See U.S. TREASURY DEPT., FEDERAL INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES 59,
62 (1951) (stating that "the principal basis for modem loss limitations" is the protection of federal
revenues in the event of a severe price decline). See also W. SCHULTZ & C. HARRIS, AMERICAN PUBLIC
FINANCE 248 (1965); Blum, supra note 6, at 254.
42 H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938) ("Personal income may be defined as the
algebraic sum of(1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in value
of the store of property rights between the beginning and the end of the period in question."). This
definition has become the starting point for income determination for most commentators. See, e.g.,
Bittker, A Comprehensive Tax Base as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, in A COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAX
BASE? A DEBATE 7-9 (1968); Galvin, More on Boris Bittker and the Comprehensive Tax Base: The Practicali-
ties of Tax Reform and the ABA "s CSTR, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1016 (1968); Musgrave, In Defense of an Income
Concept, 81 HARV. L. REV. 44 (1967); Pechman, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Comment, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 63 (1967); Pechman & Okner, Simulation of the Carter Commission Tax Proposaisfor the United States,
22 NAT'L TAXJ. 2 (1969); Shachar, The Importance of Considering Liabilities in Tax Transition, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1842, 1853 (1985).
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no realization requirement exists. 47 Instead, the taxpayer must account
for all changes in the value of his assets and liabilities each year.48 Re-
quiring this annual accounting would bring the whole tax system closer
to the Haig-Simons ideal since unpurchased accumulation, in the form of
unrealized appreciation, would be included in taxable income.
Accrual taxation has been widely criticized, however, on the grounds
that it is attainable only with unacceptable complexity.49 The complexity
arises first from the administrative burden of having to value all assets
each year. Such a process would be difficult, expensive, and subject to
potential controversy. 50 Second, complication results from the possible
inequity of requiring individuals to liquidate their assets simply to pay
the tax due on them.5'
In part because many economists 52 and tax scholars58 do not believe
that an accrual tax system is administratively feasible, they have advanced
consumption-type or cash flow taxation as an alternative to income taxa-
tion. 54 These consumption tax advocates often cite the inherent
problems of a pure accrual tax system, valuation and liquidation, as sup-
port for a shift to a consumption tax system. A consumption tax system
47 Even though the realization requirement was given consitutional status by Eisner v. Ma-
comber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920), most commentators do not think courts would impose such a
requirement today. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 43, at 1129; Bittker, supra note 1; Shakow, supra
note 8, at 1113 n.9.
48 Because the taxpayer must account for changes in value each year, the taxpayer no longer gets
the benefit of deferral. The value of deferral is important to the individual taxpayer as well as to tax
policy. See, e.g., S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 108-11, 117-25, 317-19 (1973); Shoup, The
White Paper: Accrual Accounting for Capital Gains and Losses, 18 CAN. TAX J. 96 (1970).
49 See supra note 7.
50 Hickman, supra note 1, at 244.
51 The debate on the equity or inequity of requiring a taxpayer to sell an asset in order to pay tax
on it is intellectually similar to the debate on whether a taxpayer's tax liability should be based on
ability to pay or on how much he removes from society. Those favoring the ability to pay argument
predominate in the United States. R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 6, at 207-08.
52 See, e.g., I. FISHER & H. FISHER, CONSTRUCTIVE INCOME TAXATION (1942); T. HOBBES, LEVIA-
THAN ch. 30 (1651); N. KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX (1955); J.S. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY bk. V, ch. I, § 4 (Laughlin ed. 1898); A.C. PxGou, A STUDY IN PUBLIC FINANCE 135-44
(1928); Boskin, Taxation, Saving, and the Rate of Interest, 86J. POL. ECON. 53 (1978); Bradford & Toder,
Consumption vs. Income Base Taxes: The Argument on Grounds of Equity and Simplicity, 69 NAT'L TAX A.
PROC. 25 (1976); Feldstein, The Welfare Cost of Capital Income Taxation, 86J. POL. ECON. S29, S37-S39
(1978).
53 See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 43; Bradford, The Case for a Personal Consumption Tax, in WHAT
SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE? 75 (J. Pechman ed. 1980).
54 The seminal discussion is in Andrews, supra note 43. But see Warren, Fairness and a Consumption-
Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88 HARv. L. REV. 931 (1975) (criticizing Andrew's proposal).
See also Andrews, Fairness and the Choice Between a Consumption-Type and an Accretion-Type Personal Income
Tax: A Reply to Professor Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 947 (1975).
According to proponents of the consumption-type tax, such a tax system would be easier to
administer because all costs of investments would be deducted immediately when they occurred,
rather than depreciated over the life of the asset. This system also would eliminate realization
problems. For example, all inventory costs would be deducted when inventory was created, rather
than recognized only when goods were sold. Further, a consumption tax system would eliminate the
computation of gain and determination of basis, capital gain treatment, and unrecognized realized
gain due to special statutory provisions, including those governing corporate reorganizations. Fi-
nally, a consumption tax system would eliminate the mismeasurement of income which occurs in the
present system as a result of inflation. Under the consumption tax system, consumption is measured
in nominal terms so inflation does not distort the tax base. Similarly, inflation cannot erode the
value of future deductions since depreciable assets and inventory investments are already expensed.
Capital gains received due to inflation are not taxed since no tax exists on capital gains per se.
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focuses exclusively on the consumption branch of the Haig-Simons defi-
nition because of the belief that most inequity, distortion, and complexity
arises out of the inconsistent treatment of accumulation under existing
law.55 Taxable income under a consumption tax system consists of per-
sonal money income, or in other words, purchased consumption. 6 Sav-
ings are deducted from taxable income and dissavings, or receipts, are
added. 57 Capital transactions under this system then are treated on a
cash flow basis. Investments are deducted from income when they are
made, and the proceeds of sales and other capital transactions are added
to income when received.
58
The Treasury Department5 9 and tax commentators have criticized
and rejected consumption taxation, however, as inequitable because of
its distribution of the tax burden.60 Under a consumption tax, tax bur-
dens fall most heavily on low-income households with high consumption
ratios relative to income. 61 Moreover, consumption taxes fail to mitigate
disparities in wealth. By excluding accumulation of assets, a consump-
tion tax may encourage wealth concentration.
62
The current tax system is a hybrid of the consumption and accrual
models in terms of the Haig-Simons definition. It is not a pure accrual
system because some accumulation, notably unrealized appreciation, is
not taxed.63 Obviously, it is not a consumption tax system either.
55 Andrews, supra note 43, at 1115-16.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 1133. The system requires only that the taxpayer separate business and investment
activities from personal consumption activities. Present law already makes this distinction. The tax-
payer must then keep track of business and investment activities on a cash flow basis. This too is
presently accomplished by cash flow accounting.
59 More specifically, the Treasury Department dismissed a consumption tax system due to com-
plexity, transition, perception, and international problems.
First, the Treasury contended that complexity would increase because borrowing and withdraw-
als from savings would be taxable-thus, withholding on these amounts might be required. In addi-
tion, many young adults and retired individuals who presently are not required to file or pay tax
would have to do so under a consumption tax.
Second, transition problems would arise, since a substantial amount of wealth has been accumu-
lated from after-tax income. Taxing consumption from such wealth would penalize those who saved
after-tax income. In addition, such a change to consumption would provide an incentive to avoid
taxes by hoarding money before the new tax's effective date. After the effective date, the funds could
either be deposited for a substantial deduction or used for living expenses without having to pay tax
on them.
Third, the consumption tax suffers from a perception problem. Under the consumption system,
amounts borrowed are taxable and repayment of loans are deductible. This may be perceived as
unfair and has the effect of increasing an individual's tax liabilities during early adulthood and early
retirement-periods when financial resources are commonly strained. Conversely, tax liability
would be lowest during middle age, the time when many taxpayers receive most of their income.
Finally, an international problem could also result. All other countries have income taxes and
thus foreign tax treaties would have to be renegotiated. TREASURY I, supra note 26, at 31-33.
60 See, e.g., Gunn, The Case for an Income Tax, 46 U. CH. L. REv. 370 (1979); Warren, supra note
54; Warren, Would a Consumption Tax be Fairer than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081 (1980). But see
Andrews, supra note 54.
61 J. PECHMAN, supra note 15, at 198.
62 See Warren, supra note 54, at 941-44.
63 Money savings and investment purchases are included in taxable income, but unrealized ap-
predation is not. In fact, much of this appreciation may escape taxation altogether because of the
step-up in basis at death. I.R.C. § 1014(a) (1982 and Supp. III 1985). Even realized gains may go
untaxed due to special statutory nonrecognition provisions. I.R.C. §§ 1031-1041 (1982 and Supp.
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Although the current system incorporates certain elements of both the
consumption and accrual methods of taxation as a result of the tax pol-
icy's vacillation, 64 the tax system is currently moving toward the accrual
end of the spectrum 65 as evidenced by the Tax Reform Act of 1986.66
The consequences of this movement are as yet unclear. What is clear is
that an accrual tax system would provide greater consistency in the mea-
surement of income than the current hybrid. Professor Shakow's analysis
suggests that providing greater consistency, and hence greater equity, in
an accrual system may not involve as much complexity as consumption
tax proponents have perceived. Indeed, Professor Shakow's analysis
suggests that a pure accrual tax system may be simpler than the current
hybrid system.
67
III. The Shakow Model for Accrual Taxation
While Congress was drafting the recent tax reform, Professor
Shakow contemporaneously developed a specific proposal for an accrual
tax system which attempts to solve the plaguing problems of valuation
III 1985). Further, the cost recovery provisions do not reflect accrual taxation since depredation is
computed from historical cost and not from annual decline in value. I.R.C. §§ 167-168 (1982 and
Supp. III 1985). Finally, employee and self-employed retirement savings are excluded to a limited
extent from taxable income. I.R.C. §§ 401(a), 402(b), 403(a), 415, 404 (1982 and Supp. III 1985).
See also I.R.C. § 219(a) (1982 and Supp. III 1985) (Individual Retirement Accounts), 219(e)(5) and
408(b) (payments for retirement annuities).
64 The tax system has periodically adopted consumption tax approaches. For example, the 1981
Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA), Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 201, 95 Stat. 172, adopted consumption
tax approaches to investment. The 1981 Act introduced basically three provisions which allowed
substantial expensing of investment purchases when they occurred: The Accelerated Cost Recovery
System (ACRS), the liberalized investment tax credit, and "safe-harbor" leasing. Under the ACRS
method, a taxpayer's deductions greatly exceed the value of economic depredation in the early years
of an investment. Tangible personal property could be depreciated at a 150% declining balance
method, switching to a straight line method at a time to maximize the depredation allowance. Even
faster depreciation would have been allowed under ERTA for years 1985 and later, but in 1982,
Congress enacted the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-
248, 96 Stat. 324, which repealed the additional accelerated depredation allowances scheduled for
1985 and beyond. See generally Gann, Neutral Taxation of Capital Income: An Achievable Goal?, 48 LAw &
CO=TMP. PROBS. 77, 94-96 (1985).
The 1981 Act also adopted a consumption tax approach to saving for retirement by expanding
the deduction for contributions to various retirement plans. Pub. L. No. 97-34, §§ 311-312, 95 Stat.
at 274-85.
65 The 1984 Treasury Department's proposal for tax reform was influenced by the accrual ideal
even more than the 1986 Act was. In its proposal, the Treasury Department proposed that the tax
system be adjusted so that it accurately measured real economic income in an inflationary environ-
ment. In order to achieve this accuracy, the Code would establish explicit inflation adjustments for
the basis used in calculating both depredation allowances and capital gains.
Under the Treasury Department's plan, the investment tax credit and the accelerated cost recov-
ery system would be unnecessary. Explicit indexing for inflation would ensure that future depreda-
tion allowances would maintain their real value, regardless of the rate of inflation. Accordingly, the
Treasury Department proposed that the investment tax credit be repealed, that the basis of deprecia-
ble assets be indexed for inflation, and that depreciation allowances for tax purposes be set to ap-
proximate real economic depredation. TREASURY I, supra note 26, at 98-115.
66 Under the 1986 Act, for example, many business tax credits were modified or, in the case of
the investment tax credit, repealed. Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 201-203, 211. The 1986 Act modified
depredation rules, increasing the write-off period for most assets by 40%. The combined effect of
these changes is a closer approximation of accrual taxation. The longer depredation period reflects
more accurately the actual length of economic utility, and the repeal of the tax credits adds invest-
ment purchases back to the tax base.
67 See Shakow, supra note 8, at 1115-17.
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and liquidation in an administratively feasible way. 68 Under this propo-
sal, individuals would be taxed on gains and losses on investment assets
at ordinary income rates in the year the gains or losses accrue.69 Because
the proposal aims for administrative feasibility, however, it would ex-
clude some items, such as owner-occupied houses and inexpensive con-
sumer items, from the system completely.'
0
Similarly, a practical system for accrual taxation cannot require valu-
ation of every asset of every taxpayer.71 For example, assets such as
closely held stock or collectibles are particularly hard to value. 72 For
these assets, the Shakow model favors retaining the realization require-
ment while imposing an interest deferral charge based on the holding
period of the asset.73 Conversely, recognized losses would be adjusted
to account for the decrease in tax saving value of losses. 74 The realiza-
tion rules for such assets, however, would not include all the special non-
recognition rules of current law.
75
68 Id.
69 Id. at 1119.
70 Id. at 1183. Owner-occupied residences are excluded because investment and business real
estate will be valued on an annual basis, reflecting changes in value due to both market changes and
depredation. Since owner-occupied residences only recognize gains reflecting market changes, a
method for differentiating these two types of value would have to be added. Accordingly, this pro-
posal retains the favored treatment of gains on residences. Id at 1144. Owner-occupied residences
account for approximately 16.9%o of assets held by individuals. Owner-occupied lands add another
7.8%. Id at 1141.
The Shakow model also excludes assets consisting essentially of cash and cash equivalents (sav-
ings accounts, checking accounts, money market fund shares). These assets constitute approxi-
mately 17.4% of all assets held by individuals. Accrual should not need to include these assets since
they retain the same nominal value from year to year. Any increases in value derived from these
assets are reflected in interest payments already included in income. Id at 1126.
71 Id. at 1120.
72 Id. at 1183. The Shakow model would recognize other assets on realization with an adjust-
ment to take account of deferral, including: Intangibles (goodwill, patents, trademarks, and other
intangibles); consumer durables; and possibly other debt (state and local obligations, corporate and
foreign bonds held by individuals that are privately traded). Cumulatively, these assets constitute
approximately 10.5%o of all assets held by individuals. Consumer durables and collectibles account
for 8.6%, closely held stock accounts for 1.8%6, and other hard to value debt constitutes approxi-
mately 0.1%o. No estimate of the cumulative size of intangibles exists.
73 Id. at 1122-24. The Revenue Act of 1934 made an early attempt at an interest deferral system
by implementing a step-scale plan based on the length of an asset's holding period. Revenue Act of
1934, ch. 277, § 117(a), 48 Stat. 680, 714. Under the 1934 Act, capital gains were taxed at ordinary
income rates, but the amount of gain taxed was based on the length of time the capital asset was
held. Congress premised the plan on the theory that the tax liability should approximate the amount
that would have been paid if the gain had been taxed as it accrued. 78 CONG. REc. 6170-72 (1934).
Some commentators have proposed interest deferral as a substitute for accrual. See, e.g., INsTI-
TUTE FOR FIscAL STUDIES, THE STRucTuRE AND REFORM OF DIRECr TAXATION 129, 129-35 (1978);
Brinner, Inflation, Deferral and the Neutral Taxation of Capital Gains, 26 NAT'L TAX J. 565 (1973); Dia-
mond, Inflation and the Comprehensive Tax Base, 4 J. PUB. EcoN. 227 (1975); Helliwell, supra note 36.
74 The deferral charge's potential for simplification lies in the fact that it reduces the difference
between the treatment of realized gains and unrealized appreciation. Much of the present complica-
tion stems from the rules required to compensate for that different treatment.
Deferral charges, coupled with taxation at ordinary income rates, could enable the removal of
capital loss limitations. These limitations are currently necessary to prevent taxpayers from realizing
and deducting their capital losses while declining to realize their accrued gains. A deferral charge
would discourage this manipulation. Therefore, eliminating the limitations on capital losses and
taxing capital gains at ordinary rates would make it possible to abolish the definition of capital assets
and the corresponding definitional problems. Hickman, supra note 1, at 245. This was a level the
current 1986 Act could not achieve.
75 See Shakow, supra note 8, at 1124.
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Certain business assets whose treatment already approximates ac-
crual taxation, such as inventories and accounts receivable, could be in-
cluded in the system through modified versions of current law. 76 Other
intangible business assets-goodwill and going concern value-would be
omitted from the accrual tax system due to the major practical difficulties
in valuation and the relatively insubstantial net effect on revenue of in-
cluding them in the tax base.7 7 Business and investment liabilities gener-
ally would be incorporated in the system by providing for gains when the
liabilities decrease in value and allowing for losses when the liabilities
increase in value.
7 8
With respect to the liquidity problem, Professor Shakow points out
that it may not be as formidable as it first seems. First, empirical studies
show that taxpayers with real liquidity problems are, in fact, rare.79 Sec-
ond, since the accrual system would expand the tax base it would enable
a reduction in tax rates without loss of revenue. 80 Thus, a taxpayer with
a gain on illiquid assets might not incur any substantial new tax liability
under the system.8 Finally, taxpayers with illiquid estates currently face
a more severe liquidity problem under estate tax law. 82
For those taxpayers who would still encounter liquidity problems,
the Shakow model proposes that they pay at least a certain percentage of
their income, excluding their accrued gains, as a tax on those accrued
gains.83 If tax liabilities exceeded that percentage, and the taxpayer
could prove a liquidity problem, the taxpayer could defer payment with
76 Id. at 1155-56. Under current law, two major methods of valuing inventories exist: Cost and
lower of cost and current market price. The second method would simply carry over into an accrual
system because it requires some form of valuation every year. The cost method could be modified to
carry over into an accrual system by indexing increases and decreases in the prices of relevant inven-
tory categories, with the number and precision of the categories dependent on the relative impor-
tance of precisely mirroring inventory price movements.
With regard to accounts receivable, the current structure would carry over into an accrual sys-
tem with one modification. For business with long-term accounts receivable, a taxpayer would be
required to prepare a reasonable estimate of their value based on the relationship between the inter-
est rate on the accounts receivable and some benchmark rate, such as an average federal rate in the
year of sale.
77 Id. at 1157-63. Intangibles will be taxed only on realization. Id. at 1119.
78 Id. at 1163-67. The Shakow model would exclude increases and decreases in consumer debt
(including home mortgages) and possibly small loans (under $1000), loans with adjustable interest
rates, and loans with short maturities.
79 Id. at 1174-75. Professor Shakow's data showed that if one assumed a 4.5% annual asset
appreciation rate and disregarded groups of individuals who are not expected to have serious liquid-
ity problems, less than 0.9% of the population has liquidity problems. Further, if a 13% apprecia-
tion rate is assumed, a rate higher than occurred in any period between 1961-84, only 2% of
taxpayers would have liquidity problems. Ifa rate almost twice the appreciation rate for any period
between 1961-84, 25%, is assumed, then only 3.25% would have problems. Id.
80 Id. at 1167-68, 1196-2000.
81 But see Note, Realizing Appreciation Without Sale: Accrual Taxation of Capital Gains on Marketable
Securities, 34 STAN. L. REv. 857 (1982) (discussing the effect a liquidity squeeze would have on a
taxpayer holding marketable securities).
82 Shakow, supra note 8, at 1167. Estate tax rates can exceed the highest marginal income tax
rate, and the estate tax applies to the full value of an asset, rather than the annual increase in the
asset's value as under an accrual system. Id.
83 Id. at 1176. The Shakow model proposed this treatment of illiquidity as a compromise be-
tween encouraging taxpayers to create liquidity problems, which provides a new goal for tax lawyers,
and penalizing taxpayers with liquidity problems.
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interest accruing on the deferred amount.8 4 The interest rate would be
set at a rate unattractive to most taxpayers in order to discourage per-
sons from borrowing from the government.8 5
IV. Analysis of the Shakow Model: Simplification or Complexity?
The Shakow model recognizes that any form of accrual taxation
would increase the complexity of the Code, at least to the extent that
complexity is caused by requirements of measurement and recordkeep-
ing.86 He justifies this increased complexity, however, at least in part by
what he perceives as a corresponding decrease in complexity caused by
interpretive ambiguity and tax-motivated business planning.8 7 Professor
Shakow thus maintains that a shift to accrual taxation would cause an
increase in compliance complexity justified by a corresponding decrease
in rule and transactional complexity.88
A. Types of Complexity
Compliance complexity refers to the difficulties faced by taxpayers
such as keeping records, choosing forms, and making necessary calcula-
tions.8 9 An increase in compliance complexity is specifically problematic
if it increases recordkeeping requirements of the average taxpayer who
might not otherwise need to maintain detailed records. This type of
complexity would clearly increase under an accrual system due to the
annual valuation requirement.
Transactional complexity arises because economically similar activi-
ties may have different tax consequences depending on essentially irrele-
vant distinctions among the activities.90 This inconsistent treatment
causes taxpayers to base economic decision-making at least in part on tax
considerations, as opposed to the underlying economic factors. Tax-
minimizing behavior, in turn, breeds additional complexity from tax re-
formers and legislators who respond with measures designed to circum-
vent the latest tax maneuvers.91
Rule complexity arises from problems in interpreting the written
and unwritten rules of the Code.92 Ambiguity in rules results in frustra-
tion and cynicism on the part of the taxpayer, and increases the costs of
compliance through the need for professional tax preparers, lawyers, and
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1183-84.
87 Id.
88 See generally D. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 266 (1986).
89 Id. at 266-67.
90 Id. at 267.
91 One commentator has called this kind of complexity "dynamic complexity." The initial ten-
sion is created by preferential taxation. Preferential taxation stimulates new types of transactions as
individuals seek to gain the tax benefits created by the preferences. Legislators and administrators
concerned with preserving the integrity of "legislative intent" and protecting tax revenues react, in
turn, by instituting new measures to stem the tax avoidance. Galper & Kaufman, Simplification and
Comprehensive Tax Reform, in FEDERAL INCOME TAX SIMPLIFICATION 161, 165 (C. Gustafson ed. 1979).
92 D. BRADFORD, supra note 88, at 267.
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accountants.9 3 Moreover, a law that is understood by only a small band
of accountants and tax lawyers breeds suspicion and thus undermines the
popular support which is essential to the self-assessment required by the
system.
94
The Shakow model contends that an accrual system would result in
net simplification by reducing transactional and rule complexity to such a
degree that they would offset an increase in compliance complexity.
Although this conclusion may have been complete prior to the recent tax
reform, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 has added a new variable to the
equation. The 1986 Act eliminated the capital gains preference, and thus
reduced the tension between ordinary income and capital gain. This
change, in itself, eliminates some of the same rule and transactional com-
plexity a shift to accrual taxation would eliminate. The question thus
becomes whether a further move toward accrual taxation is desirable, fol-
lowing the 1986 Act.
B. Repeal of the Capital Gains Preference Should Reduce Transactional
and Rule Complexity
By eliminating the preferential rate of taxation on capital gains, the
1986 Act may have reduced both transactional and rule complexity to
such an extent that any additional reduction in complexity by a further
move toward accrual taxation would not justify the unavoidable increase
in compliance complexity. The clearest effect of the elimination of the
preferential rate is the reduction in transactional complexity. Because all
gains are taxed in full, taxpayers no longer have an incentive to charac-
terize ordinary income as capital gain. The tax rates on realized income
from the sale of capital assets and from other sources are the same.
Therefore, the 1986 Act significantly reduces transactional complexity.
This reduction in transactional complexity should, in turn, cause a
reduction in rule complexity. Obviously, problems in rule interpretation
can be reduced simply by deleting the rules. Because the 1986 Act elimi-
nated the incentive to characterize income as capital gain, it may be pos-
sible to remove certain complex provisions from the Code. For example,
the collapsible corporation 95 and personal holding company provi-
sions,96 which are primarily aimed at attempts by taxpayers to character-
ize ordinary income as capital gain, could be deleted. Similarly, the need
for recapture provisions, 97 preventing ordinary income created by excess
depreciation deductions being taxed as capital gain, is reduced. Recap-
ture would occur automatically, since all gains are now taxed in full.
Unfortunately, the incentive to characterize losses still exists, be-
cause the 1986 Act limits the deductibility of capital losses. All reduction
93 It is estimated that over 40 to 50% of taxpayers filing returns enlist the help of a professional
tax preparer. Tax Reform and Deficit Reduction Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 200, 214 (1984) (statement of Emil M. Sunley, Director of Tax Analysis for Deloitte,
Haskins, & Sells); R. HALL & A. RABusHKA, Low TAx, SIMPLE TAx, FLAT TAX 4 (1983).
94 D. BRADFORD, supra note 88, at 266.
95 I.R.C. § 341 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
96 I.R.C. §§ 541-547 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
97 I.R.C. §§ 1239, 1245, 1250, 1255 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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in rule complexity is not lost, however. While the deletion of whole pro-
visions might be precluded, the rules still could be simplified. Moreover,
because the characterization and recapture provisions would apply only
to those taxpayers with sufficient capital losses, the provisions would be
applied less frequently. Reducing the application of complex provisions
could, in itself, result in reduced rule complexity.
Additionally, eliminating rate differentials between ordinary income
and capital gain spares taxpayers the need to undertake the complicated
netting procedures. 98 Because all capital gain is taxed at the same rate,
no need exists to divide gains and losses into separate short- and long-
term accounts.
C. Accrual Taxation May Further Reduce Transactional and Rule Complexity
Conceivably, a move towards accrual taxation could sufficiently re-
duce rule complexity to justify the increased compliance complexity
likely to result. A move toward accrual taxation would not only eliminate
complexities concerning the distinction between capital gain and ordi-
nary income, but would also eliminate, or at least reduce, complexities
over whether a realization event has occurred. 99 Indeed, eliminating the
preferential treatment of realized capital gain might increase the tension
between realized gain and unrealized appreciation.100 This tension
would manifest itself in greater pressure on the provisions that govern
the recognition and nonrecognition of gain. Taxpayers would still have
an incentive to organize their affairs so as to minimize their taxes through
the benefit of deferral. Thus, a substantial portion of the transactional
complexity achieved by reducing pressure on the characterization of gain
may be illusory, as it is merely shifted to the recognition event.
A shift toward an accrual tax system would relieve this pressure, be-
cause it abandons the realization requirement as well as the preference
for capital gains. As a result, a number of significant nonrecognition
rules could be deleted from the Code. 0 1 The deletion of these complex
nonrecognition rules would clearly reduce rule complexity. The deletion
of these rules also would reduce transactional complexity, because the
elimination of rate differentials between classes of realized income would
be coupled with the elimination of differentials between realized gain and
unrealized appreciation.
98 See Galper & Kaufman, supra note 91, at 180-81 (This conclusion was made in the context of
analyzing BLUEPRINTS, supra note 7, which had proposed taxing capital gains at ordinary rates).
99 In his article, Professor Shakow noted that abolishing the distinction between ordinary in-
come and capital gain would simplify the income tax system generally, but he also contended that
accrual taxation would result in much greater simplification. He based this contention on a review of
cases in volume 81 of the Tax Court Reporter. Two of the cases decided in that volume would be
moot if the ordinary income-capital gain distinction were eliminated. In contrast, accrual taxation
would moot four other cases, eliminate substantial issues in three cases, and substantially reduce the
importance of issues in six cases. Shakow, supra note 8, at 1119-20.
100 Hickman, supra note 1, at 225.
101 I.R.C. § 1031 (1982 and Supp. III 1985) (like-kind exchanges); § 1033 (involuntary conver-
sions); § 302 (distributions in redemption of stock); § 1034 (sales of principle residences); § 361
(corporate reorganizations).
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As noted above, the Shakow model retains, to some extent, the reali-
zation requirement with an interest deferral charge for small, difficult-to-
value assets in order to make accrual taxation administratively feasi-
ble.' 0 2 Nevertheless, although taxation of these assets is based on reali-
zation events, the Shakow model would still permit the repeal of a
number of nonrecognition rules.' 03 The interest deferral charge would
reduce the tension between realized gain and unrealized appreciation to
a degree sufficient to delete these nonrecognition rules, even without
eliminating the tension completely.
The interest deferral charge, however, would have to be set at an
equilibrium interest rate. If the interest rate were too low, then taxpay-
ers would still benefit from deferral. This time the benefit would take the
form of a loan from the government at the interest deferral rate. 104 Con-
versely, the interest deferral rate should not be set too high because this
could create an incentive to categorize assets artificially. Either of these
incentives would create an impetus to tax minimizing behavior, thereby
increasing transactional complexity. °5
V. Conclusion
In the latest round of tax reform, Congress made sweeping changes
to overhaul a tax system most viewed as unfair, inefficient, and complex.
One change intended to greatly simplify the Code was the repeal of the
long-term capital gains exclusion. Unfortunately, in its desire to purge
the Code of the complexity caused by the exclusion, Congress failed to
consider and remedy the problems that initiated the exclusion originally.
As a result, the exclusion's repeal is unstable and will probably be rein-
stated as soon as marginal tax rates are increased. Reinstatement will not
be difficult either, since Congress only repealed the preferential rate, and
102 See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
103 I.R.C. § 1031 (1982 and Supp. III 1985) (like-kind exchanges); § 351 (tax-free formation of
corporations); § 721 (tax-free formation of partnerships); § 361 (corporate reorganization).
104 The Shakow model addresses the problems associated with interest rates in its treatment of
the liquidity problem. Professor Shakow advocates that the interest rate be set at a level which
would be unattractive to most taxpayers. This would discourage persons from borrowing from the
government at rates which would be unavailable in the private debt market. By making the interest
rate unattractive, the Shakow model ensures that taxpayers will not create liquidity problems for the
purpose of obtaining, in effect, a loan from the government at a below market rate. Shakow, supra
note 8, at 1176. This concern is analogous to the interest deferral charge.
105 A deferral charge itself, however, could produce additional transactional complexity. In fact,
the Treasury Department's 1977 BLUEPRINTS rejected a deferral charge on grounds that such an
approach would engender considerable complexity with only small gains in more accurate income
measurement. Other commentators have rejected such a practice as well. The problems with inter-
est deferral stem from determining the appropriate rate of interest.
First, in order to compute the charge, a deferral percentage would have to be applied to the tax
attributable to the gain for the time period in which the asset producing it was acquired. Thus,
computing the charge would be very burdensome and potentially a source of controversy, if numer-
ous transactions or mixed assets are involved. Second, any deferral charge formula would need to
make assumptions about the taxpayer's marginal tax rates, the appropriate interest rate, and the rate
at which the gain occurred over the period the asset was held. Undoubtedly, rules using generalized
and simplifying assumptions could be devised to solve these problems, but these new rules would
introduce additional complexity. The rules would be necessarily complex and would create an arbi-
trage potential requiring complicated tax planning to take advantage of the simplifying assumptions.
Hickman, supra note 1, at 245-56.
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retained the distinction between ordinary income and capital gain in the
Code. Realistically, however, Congress could not have eliminated the
distinction entirely, because to do so would have meant eliminating all
the capital loss restrictions. Congress could not eliminate these restric-
tions due to the pressure this would put on revenues under the current
realization-based tax system.
Congress needed an alternative which would allow it to eliminate the
ordinary income-capital gain distinction without the accompanying pres-
sure on revenues. Until recently, however, the only feasible alternative
available was a consumption tax system which many already viewed as
more inequitable then the system Congress was trying to reform. Now,
following Professor Shakow's proposal, a viable alternative may exist in
accrual taxation.
The Shakow model moves the goal of a relatively pure accrual tax
system from a theoretical construct closer to a more realistic alternative
than ever before thought possible. It does so by paying particular atten-
tion to the problems of valuation and liquidation. Through a carefully
structured categorization of assets and liabilities, the model makes an-
nual valuation a less imposing specter than originally thought. Similarly,
Professor Shakow's analysis casts doubt on the importance of the liquid-
ity problem and suggests a compromise solution which neither penalizes
taxpayers with liquidity problems nor encourages them to create liquidity
problems for the benefits of deferral.
The question remains, however, whether the benefits derived from
greater consistency in the measurement of income would outweigh the
additional costs in complexity. Professor Shakow, writing before enact-
ment of the 1986 tax reform, suggests that movement from the pre-1986
Code to a full accrual tax system would not only create a more equitable
system, but a simpler system as well. Enactment of the 1986 Act helps
focus attention on this claim, and underscores the distinction between
eliminating preferential treatment of capital gain and the more radical
step of eliminating the realization requirement. The question now raised
is whether the 1986 Act already has eliminated much of the complexity
associated with capital gains so that further movement toward full accrual
taxation would involve difficult trade-offs between equity and complexity.
It is with this question that further analysis of Professor Shakow's model
should begin.
MichaelJ. Stepek
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